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In a recent paper, Arvind Virmani (2004), the director of ICRIER, looks ahead and envisages 
for 2050 a tripolar world in which the three powers would be the US, China and India. In a 
very  short  paragraph,  he  dismisses  the  perspective  that  the  European  Union  (EU)  would 
become one of the poles in such a world, saying that (a) its population is on a declining trend, 
and (b) that it would require the unlikely formation of a “virtual state” in which nation states 
would  surrender  power  to  a  European  government.  Consistent  with  this  view,  his  entire 
analysis  is conducted on  the  basis of comparisons between states and the EU as  such is 
entirely ignored.    
For a citizen of the EU, such a view is shocking. We know that you cannot beat demography 
and we are used to hear dismissive views on our growth perspectives (in fact, we supply quite 
a lot of them ourselves), but we pretend to some form of existence and we are not accustomed 
of being altogether ignored. Even the most fiercely Eurosceptic concede the EU has achieved 
something – if only to claim it should be undone.  
However, challenges have virtues. They force us to re-examine things and to question what 
has been taken for granted. I therefore wish to take this lecture as an occasion to reflect on the 
international  economic  role  of  the  EU:  its  representation  in  international  economic 
organisations; the way it uses the power it has; the involvement of the member states and the 
Union as such in this external representation; and the choices it faces.   
This will give me the occasion to address an issue of immediate relevance. Political pressure 
has started to rise in favour of a reduction of Europe’s weight in international organisations. 
In the G20 meeting of October 2005, finance ministers agreed “that the governance structure 
of the Bretton Woods institutions - both quotas and representation - should reflect changes in 
economic weight” – meaning, the EU’s weight should be reduced. They set the deadline of 
achieving  concrete  progress  on  quota  reform  by  the  2006  IMF  and  World  Bank  Annual 
Meetings. A few days before, the US Treasury lent support to a rebalancing of quotas in 
favour of emerging market economies and indicated that a consolidation of European chairs 
would  “help  to  increase  the  relative  voice  of  emerging  markets  and  developing  country 
members”  (Adams,  2005).  The  system  of  external  representation,  and  its  relationship  to 
policies, is thus becoming a concrete policy issue. 
Focus on this topic will not allow me to address a more fundamental critique, namely that the 
EU as an entity is in fact irrelevant. Let me just say the following: coming from a country 
whose citizens recently rejected a proposal for a EU constitutional treaty, I am not inclined to 
underestimate the problems we are facing. Nevertheless, I think the degree of economic and 
political integration we have achieved is considerable: all border controls are past memory; 
EU law has precedence over national law; most of the economic legislation in force in our 
countries  is  now  EU  legislation;  states  are  routinely  fined  in  cases  of  non-compliance; 
competition policy cases are decided in Brussels; the euro, which has replaced the national 
currencies of twelve countries, is run by a federal central bank; we have a parliament and a 
sort of government. “Surrender of national power” has therefore taken place already to a 
considerable extent.      
In  what  follows,  I  start  by  looking  at  Europe’s  share  in  the  distribution  of  power  in 
international economic and financial institutions and discuss whether and where Europe is 
making use of this power to set the international agenda. Then I turn to discussing reasons 
why the EU refrains from using the power it has and examine whether that can be ascribed to 
preferences or to governance structures. Finally, I offer some policy implications in section 3.  
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1.  The paradoxes of European power 
a.  How well is the EU represented in international organisations? 
Assume for a moment that an inhabitant of planet Mars is aiming to assess the distribution of 
power in international economic institutions on planet Earth. An informed and intelligent 
Martian would probably come up with something like Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Weight of the EU in international economic and financial institutions 
Institution
EU Total EU Total EU Total EU Total
Share Share Share Share Share Share Share Share
G7 4 7 8,530,200 25,800,877 7,523,804 23,919,052 259,600 712,773
57.1 100.0 33.1 100.0 31.5 100.0 36.4 100.0
G20** 5 20 8,530,200 32,491,185 7,523,804 42,553,026 259,600 3,978,923
25.0 100.0 26.3 100.0 17.7 100.0 6.5 100.0
OECD 19 30 12,590,954 32,872,708 11,843,086 31,918,154 445,038 1,158,310
membership 63.3 100.0 38.3 100.0 37.1 100.0 38.4 100.0
financing 39.8 100.0
IEA 17 26 12,308,029 31,900,906 11,273,275 30,324,233 401,488 1,010,675
65.4 100.0 38.6 100.0 37.2 100.0 39.7 100.0
IMF/WB* 25 184 12,690,643 40,285,680 12,001,028 54,739,393 455,297 6,249,771
membership 13.6 100.0 31.5 100.0 21.9 100.0 7.3 100.0
quotas 31.9
control 33.6
seats 29.5
WTO** 26 148 12,690,643 38,832,717 12,001,028 51,164,404 455,297 5,566,131
17.6 100.0 32.7 100.0 23.5 100.0 8.2 100.0
memorandum
UN 25 191 12,690,643 40,285,680 12,001,028 54,739,393 455,297 6,284,014
membership 13.1 100.0 31.5 100.0 21.9 100.0 7.2 100.0
financing 36.5 100.0
Source for GDP and population: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 15 July 2005
(**) The G20 has 19 members, plus the EU as an institutional member. In the WTO, the "European Communities" are 
counted as a separate member.
(*) For IMF and WB, "membership" gives the proportion of EU countries in total member countries, "votes" their share in the 
total quota-based votes, "control" the proportion of votes they control, assuming a country holding the chair controls the vote 
of its constituency, and "seats" the proportion of seats held by EU member countries in the Executive Board. 
PPP-based GDP 2004
(Millions US dollars) (Thousands)
Number of members Current-dollar GDP 2004 Population
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He would then note two basic facts.  
First,  that  several  international  institutions  –  the  Group  of  Seven,  the  OECD  and  the 
International Energy Agency – have a very Eurocentric membership. Thanks in part to the 
small average size of EU countries, European membership within these institutions accounts 
for far more than the share of the EU in total GDP or population.  Looking at the details, the 
Martian observer would probably be astonished to learn that in G7 finance meetings, the EU 
commissioner  for  economic  and  financial  affairs  and  the  finance  minister  of  the  country 
holding the EU presidency participate in part, in addition to the ministers of finance of the 
four European members (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) and that the president of the 
European  Central  Bank  replaces  the  three  governors  from  the  euro  area  countries  for 
discussions on multilateral surveillance. He would also note that another European country, 
Russia, is slowly making its way towards becoming a full member of the G7
1 - and conclude 
that the EU should be playing the key role in the G7.  
Our Martian would note that an exception to this Eurocentric pattern is the Group of Twenty
2, 
(an informal forum created in 2000 that includes the ministers of finance of the G7 members, 
Australia and eleven emerging countries, plus the EU) but as he might learn, this grouping 
was  created  precisely  to  correct  the  prevailing  bias  in  the  G7  and  to  engage  the  major 
emerging  countries  in  an  informal  economic  dialogue.  Nevertheless,  with  four  country 
members and a representation as an entity, the EU is well represented in the G20.  
Second,  turning  to  global  institutions  like  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  or  the 
Bretton Woods institutions, our Martian could observe that the EU accounts for a significant 
share of their membership: 26 (the 25 member states plus the EU as a separate entity) out of 
148 WTO members and 25 out of 184 IMF / WB members.  
There is no weighting of votes (and there are no votes) in the WTO but there is one in the 
Bretton Woods institutions. Our Martian would thus devote some efforts to assessing the 
weight of the EU in those institutions as there are several ways to measure it, but having 
understood  their  intricate  governance  structure,  he  would  conclude  that  they  converge  to 
assess the voting weight of the EU at about 30%. This is, he would note, in line with the share 
of the EU in the current-dollar world GDP but significantly more than its share in PPP-based 
world GDP or population. It is also far above the 17 % quota of the US and the 15% blocking 
minority.   
Martians have a reputation for being good mathematicians. With some maths and the help of a 
computer, our observer could compute the true power of the EU: its Banzhaf voting power 
index – that is, the frequency with which it is the swing voter when behaving as a block. He 
would then conclude, as did Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (2005) in a recent paper, that the potential 
power of the EU25 in the IMF is 50% higher than its voting weight. If they were to form a 
coalition, the EU countries would by far be the dominant power in the IMF with a voting 
power index of 48% - the next one being the US with 7%.  
Talking  to  insiders,  the  Martian  would  learn  a  few  additional  facts:  first,  that  being  by 
tradition a European, the Managing Director of the IMF is in fact designated by the EU
3; 
                                                
1 Russia is not included in Table 1 calculations. 
2 I am referring here to the finance G-20. There is also a trade G20, which has formed on the occasion of the 
Doha round, and is exclusively composed of emerging and developing countries. They happen to have the same 
number of members, hence the same name. 
3 Intra-EU coordination on the choice of a candidate has gradually increased. The current MD, Rodrigo Rato, 
was designated by the EU. His predecessor, Horst Köhler, was appointed after another German candidate, Caio 
Koch Weser, had been vetoed by the US administration. On this occasion there was an attempt to break with the 
tradition and propose for candidate Stanley Fischer, at that time a US citizen, but his candidacy did not go far.    5 
second,  that  the  G7  routinely  behaves  as  a  caucus  within  the  International  Financial 
Institutions and that since its represents 46% of the vote in those institutions, its positions hold 
considerable  clout. From  that, he would certainly  deduce that the power of  the  EU  goes 
beyond its formal voting power.         
Our Martian would presumably conclude that the EU is the clear winner in the distribution of 
international institutional power. In fact, this observation has not escaped some inhabitants of 
planet Earth. For example, Vijay Kelkar and co-authors (2005) note that the combined votes 
of Brazil, China and India in the Bretton Woods institutions are abut 20% below those of  
Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, while their combined GDPs at market exchange rates are 
23 percent higher, their combined GDPs at PPP exchange rates are four times higher, and 
their populations are 29 times higher
4. These are astonishing figures, which may explain why 
the Asian countries feel so little ownership in the Bretton Woods institutions.  
Assuming  he  had  some  kind  of  Marxist  background,  our  Martian  would  carry  on  his 
investigation and look at the power of money. He would then note that the EU member states 
provide between 30 and 40% of the financing of international institutions. He would also look 
at the financing of development and observe that in 2004, the members of the EU provided 43 
billion US dollars in official development assistance out of a total of 79 billion
5. He would 
also observe that in addition to having two development banks of their own (the European 
Investment  Bank  and  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development),  they 
participate in the African, Asian and Latin American regional development banks.   
Having observed that the EU combines the power of number, the voting power and the power 
of  money,  our  Martian  would  presumably  conclude  that  it  is  the  dominant  player  in  the 
international economic and financial game – meaning, that it holds the agenda-setting power 
and is in a position to assemble majorities that support its views.      
The  next  question  our  Martian  would  ask  himself  is  whether  the  EU  makes  use  of  its 
institutional power to set, or at least to shape the architecture of the multilateral system, to 
determine the agenda of the discussions, to broker deals that correspond to its objectives, and 
to influence decisions.  
Answering that question is however much more difficult as it implies relying on case-by-case 
observations and on the testimonies of the inhabitants of planet Earth.  
 
b.  Is the EU an agenda setter ?  
To  hold  voting  power  in  international  organisations  does  not  necessarily  mean  being  an 
effective power. Indeed, three years ago, the Europeans were shocked by the publication of a 
paper by Robert Kagan (2002) entitled Power and Weakness. Kagan’s main thesis was that it 
was time to realise that Europeans and Americans did not share a common view of the world. 
Europe, he said, “is turning away from power, [..] it is moving beyond power into a self-
contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation”. 
The Europeans however were quick to take some comfort from a book by another US foreign 
policy  scholar,  Joseph  Nye  (2002),  whose  thesis  was  rather  that  the  world  is  moving  in 
Europe’s  direction.  International  power,  he  said,  does  not  need  to  rest  on  force  and  be 
discretionary. It can be based on, and draw legitimacy from, commonly agreed rules. In short, 
there can be something called soft power.  
                                                
4 Quoted in Truman (2005).   
5 Source : OECD DAC data for 2004.    6 
This was exactly what the Europeans wanted to hear. Being a soft power could reconcile the 
aspiration to be a world role and the aversion to force. Competition commissioner Mario 
Monti – who, while playing by the rules, was soon to block the merger of US giants GE and 
Honeywell– and trade commissioner Pascal Lamy became the incarnations of this new kind of 
civilised international power.  
There is considerable truth in this characterisation. In international economics as elsewhere, 
the EU is the champion of rules (Laïdi, 2005). The reason for that is straightforward: it is 
itself is based on rules. The entire history of European integration can be looked at as a patient 
yet consistent attempt at rebuilding intra-European relations on the basis of a system of law, 
rules  and  decision-making  procedures.  It  is  therefore  quite  natural  for  it  to  envisage 
international  relations  in  the  same  way  and  to  champion  global  governance.  Hence,  for 
example, the EU’s active role in the creation of the International Criminal Court, the WTO, or 
the  Kyoto  protocol  on  global  warming.  The  US,  by  contrast,  remains  suspicious  of  any 
international constraint that would bind the exercise of discretionary power. In the words of 
George  W.  Bush,  it  does  not  accept  having  to  ask  for  a “permission slip”  before  taking 
decisions.       
But is the EU really a soft power? Does it have a vision of the world and an agenda? Does it 
play the power game within institutions? Or does it only take comfort in an oxymoronic 
characterisation of what it pretends to be?  
To answer these questions and assess the role the EU has been able to play, topics have to 
taken one by one. Providing a comprehensive and systematic assessment would require very 
substantial  research.  Here,  I  will  only  survey  three  domains  in  a  cursory  and  admittedly 
impressionistic way: international trade; exchange rates and macroeconomic surveillance; and 
international finance.   
Trade 
The EU is without any doubt a major player in the international trade negotiations. It has 
clearly stated priorities – including, you may think, disputable ones – and the ability to push 
for them. Together with the US, it has in fact steered the successive international discussions 
on multilateral trade liberalisation.  
In the “legacy” paper he posted at the end of his mandate as trade commissioner, Pascal Lamy 
claimed that “The lesson to be taken from the experience of the past five years is that, when it 
chooses to pursue a truly federal policy, the EU can play a decisive role on the world stage. 
Together, we have a far greater ‘weight’ than the sum of the Member States. We have the 
ability, not only to resist initiatives that we do not support [..], but also to set the international 
agenda.  The  priority  given  to  development  in  the  Doha  Agenda,  or  the  agreement  on 
medicines are evidence of this pivotal European role” (Lamy, 2004).  
There is perhaps a degree of exaggeration in this self-assessment. The failure of the Cancun 
ministerial conference and the EU’s inability to make the Singapore topics an essential part of 
the Doha round are useful reminders of the limits to European power. Nevertheless, Europe is 
a strong  player and  interestingly, its power seems  able to  survive changes in negotiation 
arrangements.  The  failure  of  Cancun  was  widely  attributed  to  an  underestimation  by  the 
incumbents (the industrialised countries) of the rising weight of emerging countries. Having 
reached a bilateral deal on agriculture, the US and the EU had not properly assessed the 
difficulty of reaching an agreement with the other players.  
However, the Lamy legacy paper notes that the “Quad” – the informal group formed by the 
US, the EU, Japan and Canada that had been playing a steering role in the previous trade 
rounds – met for 20 minutes only during the 1999-2004 stint of the Prodi commission. In lieu   7 
of this has come what the paper describes as “a flexible feast of mini and micro Ministerials, 
ad hoc small groupings, always with EU, US, Brazil and India at the core”. In other words, 
the rise of emerging countries has not led to a diminished EU role but rather to a de facto 
replacement of Japan and Canada by Brazil and India. 
Turning to substance, today’s international trade architecture owes a lot to the EU. As already 
mentioned, the creation of the WTO was the crowning achievement of its sustained effort to 
strengthen the multilateral system. However, and somewhat paradoxically, the EU is also the 
inventor  of  trade  regionalism.  It  is  itself a  regional  block  and  has  actively  promoted  the 
creation  of  regional  trade  arrangements.  Trade  scholars  are  thus  generally  struck  by  the 
complexity of its actual policy, especially by its combination of regional and multilateral 
approaches. Why, for example, does the EU have preferential trade agreements with virtually 
all countries in the world? What is the rationale for having special trade agreements with both 
close neighbours and distant partners, rich and poor countries, competitors and protégés? How 
does  that  relate  to  its  stated  support  for  multilateralism?  Why  does  it  oscillate  between 
multilateralism and regionalism?  
The lack of clear answers to those questions is an indication of the limits to the EU’s ability to 
develop a consistent strategy. But here again, the EU has for better or worse been providing 
leadership.      
International macroeconomics  
There are many reasons why the EU should be a key player in international macroeconomic 
and exchange rate affairs.  
First of all, Europe has made a major economic and institutional investment in the creation of 
a common currency and the setting-up of supporting institutions. While the motivations for 
the creation of the euro were in large part internal, the expectation that it would become a 
major international currency also played its role – I suspect even a prominent one in the case 
of some of the proponents of the European currency.  
Second, having a common currency has strong implications for policymaking. It implies that 
the balance of payments and the exchange rate become collective goods and must therefore be 
managed jointly – if at all managed.   
Third, the EU still accounts for one-third of world GDP at current exchange rates and one-
fifth at PPP exchange rates. Its main currencies, the euro and the pound sterling, rank number 
two  and  four  in  international  currency  transactions.  The  EU  also  holds  very  significant 
external  assets  and  liabilities.  According  to  Philip  Lane  and  Gian  Maria  Milesi-Ferretti 
(2004), in the period since the creation of the euro, gross capital flows from and to the euro 
area have actually been higher than for the US – 7.2 trillion US dollars in 1999-2003 against 
6.1 trillion for the US.  
Therefore, the EU and/or the euro area have undoubtedly a major stake in the international 
monetary system. However, since the launch of the euro, neither the EU as a whole nor the 
euro area has expressed any strong intention to build on it to enhance their international role.  
On the institutional side, there has been no major reshuffle in the external representation of 
the euro area after 1999 – in spite of numerous and long-standing proposals from academic 
circles and obviously from the European commission.  
On substance, the Europeans have remained soft-spoken or even silent on global issues. In 
stark  contrast  to  the  US,  they  have  not  expressed  strong  views  on  issues  such  as  the 
unwinding of current account imbalances or the Chinese exchange rate. On the euro-dollar 
exchange rate, several mutually inconsistent opinions have frequently been expressed by the   8 
ministers of finance and central bank governors. On the nature and speed of the US current 
account adjustment, Europeans have more than once given the impression that their best hope 
was for a preservation of the exchange rate status quo – while routinely exhorting the US to 
fiscal discipline and a correction of the external deficit. On the Chinese exchange rates, they 
have not expressed specific views – although their interest may differ substantially from that 
of the US.    
In  short,  European  policymakers  seem  to  have  de  facto  refrained  from  drawing  the 
conclusions from the world status of their currency.       
International finance  
The  IMF  and  World  Bank  boards  very  rarely  go  to  vote.  Rather,  the  chair  proposes 
conclusions based on its reading of the majority view, and decisions are then adopted by 
consensus. No formal analysis of the votes is therefore possible and one must draw on the 
analysis of episodes and actual decisions.  
The years since the 1994 Mexican crisis and even more since the 1997-1998 Asian crisis have 
been  characterised  by  an  intense  discussion  on  the  reform  of  the  international  financial 
architecture. Although the frequency and intensity of crises have abated since the Argentine 
meltdown of 2002, the discussion is not over, as illustrated by the strategic review of the 
International Monetary Fund that is being prepared and is expected to be examined in 2006. 
Major issues have been and still are on the agenda such as the resolution of financial crises, 
the role of the IMF and the World Bank, or the scope for regional arrangements, especially in 
Asia.    
The Europeans have certainly been part of the discussion within the G7, the G20, the Bretton 
Woods institutions and in public forums, and they may claim some successes such as the 
partial reform of IMF governance through the creation of the International Monetary and 
Financial  Committee  (IMFC)  or  the  so-called  involvement  of  the  private  sector  in  crisis 
resolution. 
However, careful analysis of the discussion shows that they have rarely set the agenda. They 
have often responded to new developments in a reactive mode, slowly adapting to events and 
adjusting to new (frequently US) proposals, and have almost never pushed for radical new 
ideas.  In a paper I wrote in 2000 with Benoît Coeuré, our conclusion was that the US had 
behaved  throughout  the  financial  crises  as  the  (mostly,  but  not  exclusively  benevolent) 
hegemon of international finance, and that Europe had not behaved as the world monetary and 
financial power it could be and sometimes pretended to be. Developments since that paper 
was written do not lead me to change this conclusion.  
Riccardo  Faini,  a  former  Executive  Director  with  the  IMF,  and  Enzo  Grilli  (2004)  have 
attempted to measure quantitatively the influence of the US, the EU and Japan in the IMF and 
World  Bank  decisions  by  assessing  whether  the  geographical  lending  pattern  of  those 
institutions reflects their respective bilateral trade of financial relations patterns. Their results 
suggest that the US and the EU are both influential, but the former more than the latter. They 
especially  contrast  the  importance  of  both  trade  and  financial  links  for  the  US  with  the 
absence of any discernable influence of the EU’s financial links. This is an admittedly rather 
indirect measure that is subject to technical discussion, but it corresponds well to the casual 
observation that the US financial community is much more concerned by, and vocal on IMF 
issues than the European one.  
Here again, therefore, the EU’s effective role does not seem to be commensurate with the 
potential role its representation in the Bretton Woods organisations could allow it to play.       9 
Summing  up, there is a  striking  contrast between Europe’s formal power in international 
organisations and forums and the less prominent  role it plays in  substantive international 
discussions – with the exception of trade matters. The question, thus, is why Europe does not 
really make use of the institutional power it has.    
  
2.  Why does Europe refrain from using its power?  
a.  Hypotheses 
The first potential explanations for this contrast are disinterest and distraction. Europeans are 
perhaps happy not  to be  excessively involved  in world  governance and to  free-ride on a 
presumably benevolent US hegemony. Or they may be occupied by domestic and regional 
affairs.  
There is certainly some truth in those hypotheses. The median voter in the EU-25 member 
country is a small open economy that is used to taking the state of the world as given instead 
of trying to change it according to its preference or its interest. It is also undisputable that 
since the launch of the Single Market programme in the mid-1980s, the EU has been busy 
dealing with its twin processes of deepening and widening as well as with the corresponding 
reforms of its institutions and governance – not to speak of the domestic economic reforms. 
Most of the senior policymakers’ energy has in fact been devoted to this internal agenda, with 
the consequence that global changes have sometimes been overlooked in the process.  
However, it is hard to be fully convinced by such explanations. To begin with, not all member 
states share the small-country culture and the EU as a whole is without doubt a very large 
entity. As to the distraction hypothesis, it may have played a role temporarily but it cannot 
account for a permanent behaviour. At any rate, if this were the main explanation for Europe’s 
intermittent international presence, the EU can be expected to become more assertive on the 
external front if and when it solves its internal difficulties.  
A related possibility is that the EU is not equipped with the same intellectual firepower as the 
US.  Benoît  Coeuré  and  I  have  observed  that  in  the  discussion  on  the  reform  of  the 
international financial architecture of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the US authorities had 
constantly drawn on new ideas and proposals emanating from the research community. A 
similar  pattern  has  emerged  on  issues  such  as  the  global  current  account  imbalances  or 
China’s exchange rate regime, which have become more frequently than in Europe the topic 
of  policy-oriented  academic  research.  However,  the  supply  of  policy  research  cannot  be 
regarded as exogenous. A major reason why the field is less active in Europe is that there is 
much less demand from, and interaction with, the community of policymakers
6.           
This leaves us with two main hypothesis. One is that the EU is divided because preferences 
differ among its constituent member states. The other is dysfunctional governance.  
The preference heterogeneity argument has weight. Within an increasingly diverse EU, there 
are many reasons why preferences should differ and there is none to believe that this diversity 
does not affect international economic relations. From intellectual and policy traditions to 
degrees of openness and patterns of trade and financial integration of the world economy, 
several factors can explain why the EU  countries can have difficulties reaching common 
ground on global matters. 
                                                
6 Jaume Ventura has pointed out to me that European economists have in fact been very active in research on 
global imbalances – though mostly through US research institutions like the NBER. This is a clear indication 
that the EU does not lack the intellectual ability to address global issues.    10 
However, this is also true for international trade – and even more so. From development 
levels  and  specialisation  patterns  to  the  functioning  of  labour  markets  and  to  domestic 
political institutions, there is every reason to consider that the economics and the political 
economy  of  trade  liberalisation  differ  widely  within  the  EU.  The  case  of  agriculture  is 
especially striking (Figure 1): the EU includes all varieties of situations – and therefore all 
kinds of preferences – but it does have a common policy for agricultural trade. 
Figure 1: Agriculture Indicators for the EU25
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The  same  is  actually  true  in  the  US.  A  well-known  stylised  fact  is  that  the  regional 
specialisation is more pronounced within the US than within the EU. Hence, from a political 
economy standpoint one can suspect a higher degree of trade preference heterogeneity among 
US states than among EU countries.  
This leads to the dysfunctional governance hypothesis. The EU has put in place very complex 
and diverse arrangements for organising its international economic and financial relations 
with the rest of the world. In some fields, policy responsibility is fully delegated to an EU 
institution – in practice, the Commission or the ECB – which has been given a clear mandate 
to act. In others, responsibility is divided between member states and they only endeavour to 
coordinate  their  views.  It  could  thus  be  the  inefficiency  of  some  of  its  governance 
mechanisms that prevents the EU from playing the role it could play.  
This is clearly the interpretation suggested by Pascal Lamy when speaking of the EU’s ability 
to play the role of an agenda-setter. This is also the one proposed by Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi, 
who prior to his appointment to the board of the European central bank played a key role in 
the coordination of European positions in international monetary and financial affairs. He 
said: “If EU countries wish to improve their collective influence in international issues and 
the  IMF,  some  institutional  changes  in  the  way  European  interests  are  represented  and 
promulgated may be necessary” (Bini Smaghi, 2004). If this is the right explanation, the EU 
first and foremost needs to reform its external representation in the fields where it is not 
effective.  
This is where Arvind Virmani strikes back. The reason why the EU is not a full power may 
have  to  do  with  the  degree  to  which  member  states  of  the  EU  stand  ready  to  accept  a   11 
federalisation  of  international  economic  policy.  A  closer  look  at  the  governance  of 
international relations in the EU is therefore required.  
b.  Alternative models of governance 
As already indicated, the EU does not rely on a single template for organising its external 
economic relations. On the contrary, depending on the field responsibility for them can be 
assigned to the EU, to the member states or jointly to both levels. However, there is a limited 
number  of underlying  models.  Table 2, which  draws  on Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry  (2003), 
provides a rationalisation for the existing arrangements. We can distinguish: 
•  an  unconditional  delegation  model,  in  which  the  member  states  fully  and 
unconditionally delegate a policy responsibility to an EU institution;  
•  a supervised delegation model, in which they delegate representation and negotiation 
authority while retaining control rights (the EU body can then be considered an agent 
and the member states multiple principals). The standard case here is trade, where the 
Commission  has  delegation  but  is  given  a  mandate  by,  and  is  accountable  to,  a 
committee formed of representatives of the member states;  
•  a coordination model, in which member states simply commit to coordination while 
retaining their prerogatives. This is the model in use for the G7 and the international 
financial institutions.     
 
Table 2: Governance models in EU external economic relations 
Model  Main features  Examples 
Unconditional delegation  Policy responsibility delegated to EU 
institution 
 
Monitoring by MS, if any, not binding on 
decisions by EU institution 
Competition policy (subject to 
appeal to ECJ) 
 
ECB exchange rate policy 
(monitoring by Parliament) 
Supervised delegation  External representation and negotiation 
authority delegated to EU institution 
 
MS exercise surveillance: issue 
guidelines and monitor implementation  
Trade in goods and services 
 
Market regulation 
 
Environment 
Coordination  No delegation of external representation 
to EU institution. 
 
MS coordinate among themselves and 
with EU institutions, may or may not 
commit to follow guidelines. 
International macroeconomics 
 
International finance 
   
As a matter of principle, none of the three models is intrinsically superior. Federalists have a 
preference for unconditional delegation, but it raises issues of accountability, especially when 
the mandate is broad and the performance not easily observable. Supervised delegation is a 
compromise  that  combines  accountability  to  the  principals  and  centralisation  in 
implementation. Coordination has virtues when externalities are limited or depend on the 
issue that is being addressed.  
A good way to assess these models is to look at them through the lenses of the theory of 
contracts – with the EU states playing the role of multi-principals and the body in charge of 
common policy that of an agent. This leads us to conclude that the choice for a particular one 
depends on externalities, preferences, the cost of acquiring decision-relevant information and   12 
the ability of the principals to monitor the agent, as well as on the distributional risks involved 
in majority voting
7.     
From this perspective, supervised and unconditional delegation each have virtues – as for the 
choice between decision by elected politicians and delegation to an independent agency. But 
there are few arguments to prefer coordination to supervised delegation in the field of external 
economic  and  financial  relations,  where  externalities  are  large  and  economies  of  scale 
significant.  Quite  apart  from  the  power  game  in  international  institutions,  independent 
participation in global governance accompanied by a loose intra-EU coordination mechanism 
discourages national governments from investing in the acquisition of relevant information, 
from trading-off short-term benefits for long-term gains and from resisting special interest 
groups.  It  encourages  cajoling  special interests  and  popular  beliefs at home,  or  investing 
political energy on narrow issues, while free-riding on the more important ones. Those are in 
fact behaviours that can be observed in this field.   
The advantage of supervised delegation over coordination is that it allows the member states 
to  internalise  externalities  while  retaining  control  of  the  mandate  given  to  their  agent  in 
international institutions. It is a flexible mechanism that does not lead to transferring complete 
control to the EU level and retains a steering role for the member states.  
Summing up, the choice for the EU is not between complete centralisation and complete 
decentralisation. Supervised delegation is a workable model that has been used for a long time 
in  the  trade  field  and  provides  a  reasonable  compromise  between  accountability  and 
efficiency.    
The question is, then, why has the EU not adopted this model across the board? The reason is 
quite straightforward: moving to supervised delegation does raise a significant difficulty as it 
affects the balance of  power within the EU.  
In the field of international macroeconomics, the bigger member states – those who belong to 
the  G7  –  hold  a  de  facto  monopoly  of  external  representation.  They  are  not  keen  on 
surrendering  it, as  it  would  not  only  imply  delegating  power  to  the  EU  but  also  sharing 
supervision  with  the  smaller  member  states,  which  have  virtually  no  say  at  present. 
Furthermore, the G7 is a flexible forum without a predetermined mandate that can address a 
very wide range of issues. This does not fit well with the governance model of the EU, which 
assigns specific responsibilities to the EU level.   
As for the Bretton Woods institutions and the field of international finance, Figure 2 gives 
relative voting weights within the EU (according to the Nice voting system) and the IMF. It  
suggests that the major losers in the adoption of a supervised delegation model would again 
be the bigger countries: Germany, the UK and France, whose current weights within the EU 
representation at the IMF significantly exceed their weights within the EU.  
 
                                                
7 Maskin and Tirole (2001) are a useful reference.    13 
Figure 2: European MS Voting Weights in the EU and the IMF
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Other  potential  losers  are  the  Netherlands  and  Belgium,  which  both  are  significantly 
overweighted and both hold a chair at the Executive Board of the IMF. In fact, the prestige 
attached to chairing a constituency is a further obstacle to a consolidated EU representation. 
This helps explain why the situation has remained unchanged until now.  
Summing up, the transfer of international representation to the EU would involve an internal 
redistribution of power, not only from the states to the EU level – this could be lessened 
through appropriate supervision mechanisms that would leave control rights in the hands of 
the member states – but among the member states. This internal dimension of the power game 
certainly plays a significant role in the maintenance of the status quo.   
 
3.  Policy implications 
Let me now turn to the policy implications of this analysis.  
The situation I have described is one of over-representation and under-effectiveness of the EU 
in international economic relations. I think that this combination is increasingly unsustainable 
and that calls for a change cannot and should not be resisted any more.  
It is unsustainable, first, because the only way the EU could justify remaining the winner in 
the  distribution of formal power is by behaving like a benevolent hegemon –  that is,  by 
providing  a  public  good  that  would  lead  the  other  players  to  accept  its  dominance.  As 
developed above, the muted role the EU plays in substantive international discussions does 
not justify an overrepresentation. 
It is unsustainable, second, because reform of the global economic and financial institutions 
and the rebalancing of power it implies are not simply required for the sake of fairness. More 
importantly, they are necessary to ensure a sufficient degree of ownership in the multilateral 
system.  The  EU  has  every  interest  to  ensure  that  all  countries  share  ownership  in  the   14 
multilateral system. The more imbalanced this system is, the stronger the temptation will be 
for those who feel underrepresented to look for alternative solutions. Increasingly, East Asian 
countries express interest in regional rather than multilateral cooperation. They also count on 
self-insurance  through  the  accumulation  of  reserves  instead  of  relying  on  international 
financial institutions. This behaviour has the potential to severely undermine the multilateral 
system – but it is understandable as long as East Asia feels that system is unfairly dominated 
by others.    
It is unsustainable, finally, because Europe’s interests call for a change. Pressure has begun to 
mount for a redistribution. The Europeans are tempted to postpone it, if only because they do 
not  know  how  to  redistribute  power  among  themselves.  Even  from  an  entirely  selfish 
viewpoint, this would be a mistake. Europe’s share in world GDP is rapidly declining as a 
consequence  of  its  demography  and  of  the  accelerated  development  of  major  emerging 
countries. It is bound to decline further – and rather fast.  The more the adjustment is delayed, 
the lesser the weight of Europe will be in the international institutions.  
This adjustment does not need to involve the EU only. For example, Saudi Arabia is currently 
over-represented in the IMF with a quota that exceeds that of India, and the same applies to 
some other oil producers. But this also calls for taking the initiative because the earlier the EU 
accepts  the  need  for  change,  the  more  able  it  will  be  to  call  for  a  general  review  of 
representations and quotas.  
The EU needs to trade off formal, but partially ineffective power for a formally diminished, 
but more effective influence in world economic affairs. For this to happen, it must seize the 
opportunity of the calls for a rebalancing of representations in the IMF and other institutions 
and grouping and reform its own external representation. This does not necessarily imply a 
complete federalisation of external representation, which would not correspond to existing 
internal arrangements and for that reason would not be effective. The supervised delegation 
model in use in the trade field offers a middle way. It allows member states to retain control 
rights through the definition of a mandate and the supervision of its implementation.  
The main difficulty the EU has to solve is the internal redistribution of power that will follow 
a  redefinition  of  its  external  representation.  This  is  an  admittedly  complex  issue,  which 
involves at least as much concerns about prestige, as about effective power. However, this is 
hardly a valid excuse for inaction – unless the EU wants to demonstrate that it does not 
deserve the power it has. Fortunately, the multiplicity of institutions and forums offers an 
opportunity for compromise. For it to be found, action has to start.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
I started this lecture with the remark that challenges have virtues. I hope I have shown you 
that this is indeed the case and that the image of the future offered by Arvind Virmani in his 
thought-provoking paper is for an European an opportunity to revisit the achievements that 
are often taken for granted. 
I am not sure I have been able to convince Arvind Virmani that he was wrong to discard the 
EU as a player in the world economy of the XXI
st century. From what I have said, he may 
even conclude that he was in fact right.      
We are in fact not that far from each other. He claims the EU is not a player in the world 
economy.  I  think  it  should  rather  be  characterised  as  an  accidental  player  –  one  which, 
depending on its internal arrangements or the lack of them, is sometimes at the table and 
sometimes off the table.    15 
What I wish to stress is that in the  XXI
st century, the Europeans will not any more be able to 
afford the luxury of this strange position. The choice for them is to be part of the game or to 
be absent from it. The earlier they choose, the more able they will be to build on the vast 
formal power they still have in international organisation to exert an effective international 
influence.  
It is therefore more than time for the EU to move away from the status of an accidental player.   
 
 
References 
 
Adams,  Timothy  (2005),  “The  US  View  on  IMF  Reform”,  paper  prepared  for  the  IIE 
conference on IMF reform, September, www.iie.com.  
Bini Smaghi, Lorenzo (2004), “A Single EU Seat in the IMF?”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies vol. 42 n°2.  
Bini Smaghi, Lorenzo (2005), “IMF Governance and the Political Economy of a Consolidated 
European  Seat”,  paper  prepared  for  the  IIE  conference  on  IMF  reform,  September, 
www.iie.com.  
Coeuré, Benoît, and Jean Pisani-Ferry (2000), “Events, Ideas and Actions: An Intellectual and 
Institutional Retrospective on the Reform of the International Financial Architecture”, mimeo.  
Coeuré,  Benoît,  and  Jean  Pisani-Ferry  (2003),  “One  Market,  One  Voice?:  European 
Arrangements in International Economic Ralations”, mimeo.  
Faini, Riccardo, and Enzo Grilli (2004), “Who Runs the IFIs?”, CEPR Discussion paper n° 
4666? October.  
Kagan, Robert (2002), “Power and Weakness”, Policy Review n°113.  
Kelkar, Vijay L., Praveen K. Chaudhry, Marta Vanduzer-Snow, and V. Bhaskar (2005), “The 
International Monetary Fund: Integration and Democratization in the 21st Century”, paper 
presented to the G24 Technical Group Meeting, Manila, the Philippines (March 17-18).  
Kenen,  Peter,  Jeffrey  Shafer,  Nigel  Wicks  and  Charles  Wyplosz  (2004),  International 
Economic  and  Financial  Cooperation:  New  Issues,  New  Actors,  New  Responses,  Geneva 
Report on the World Economy n°6, ICMB/CEPR.  
Laïdi, Zaki (2005), La norme sans la force: l’énigme de la puissance européenne. Presses de 
Sciences Po, Paris.  
Lane, Philip, and Gian Maria Milesi Ferretti (2004), “Financial Globalisation and Exchange 
Rates”, mimeo.  
Lamy, Pascal (2004), Trade Policy in the Prodi Commission : An Assessment, November, 
http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2004/november/tradoc_120087.pdf  
Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole (2001), “The Politician and the Judge” 
Nye, Joseph (2002), The Paradox of American Power, Oxford.  
Truman, Edwin (2005), “International Monetary Fund Reform: A Survey of the Issues”, paper 
prepared for the IIE conference on IMF reform, September, www.iie.com.  
Virmani,  Arvind  (2004),  “A  Tripolar  World:  India,  China  and  the  US”,  mimeo,  Indian 
Council for Research on International Economic Relations, May.  